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The Problematic Provision and
Protection of Health and Welfare
Benefits for Retirees
DONALD T. WECKSTEIN*
Professor Weckstein explores the conceptual underpinnings of the
law governing health and welfare benefits of retired employees. He
begins with a discussion of bargaining rights and duties and high-
lights the legal consequences of an employer modification of bar-
gained-for retiree benefits in various contexts. He asserts that
there is no legal prohibition on modification or termination absent
proof of a contractual commitment which gives the retiree a vested
right to benefits. Recognizing the need for legislation, Professor
Weckstein concludes that until the law is changed, a presumption
against contractual vesting of retiree benefits should be applied,
and extrinsic evidence should be admitted to rebut this
presumption.
THE SITUATION
Business had been going well for the Company. Demand had been
strong and the Company had a major share of the market. Even the
presence of a strong union did not interfere with the rosy picture.
While, of course, the union wanted more, take home pay was ade-
quate and the leadership was concerned about doing something for
its more senior workers and for those who had already retired after
working many years for the Company when the pay and benefits
were not as good. Under these circumstances, the union was able to
persuade the Company to agree to expand the health insurance cov-
erage to include prescription drugs and dental services, and to make
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. B.B.A., 1954, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin; J.D., 1958, University of Texas; LL.M., 1959, Yale University.
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these services, as well as basic medical and hospitalization insurance,
available to already retired employees to the extent they were not
already covered by Medicare. The additional insurance coverage was
paid for both by a larger company contribution per hour worked to a
health and welfare benefit plan trust, and from the unexpectedly
higher interest being earned on funds previously contributed to the
trust. The senior workers liked that because they could look forward
to similar benefits when they retired.
That was ten years ago; before sky-rocketing medical costs, and
even more importantly, before the introduction into the American
market of new, much less expensive (and some would say, better
made) foreign products. Now business prospects were no longer rosy.
Despite economies and lower prices (in an attempt to meet the for-
eign competition), sales and profits were down. This year it was the
Company that sought concessions from the union. These included a
co-pay provision for current workers' medical benefits and an elimi-
nation of health insurance benefits for retired workers. If the conces-
sions were not granted, the Company threatened that they might
have to shut down the plant or declare bankruptcy. Then, the Com-
pany spokesperson said, "Nobody gets any benefits." Faced with
these prospects, the union leadership was most concerned with pre-
serving jobs and take-home pay, and reluctantly was willing to go
along with the benefit cuts. Representatives of the retired workers,
however, threatened to sue if their health benefits were eliminated.
With the aid of a mediator, a deal was reached between the Com-
pany and union that authorized the trustees to stop purchasing
health insurance for retired employees "if they can legally do so."
Can they? Is it true that nobody will get any benefits if the plant
closes or the Company goes bankrupt? Were there legal problems in
affording the retired workers health insurance benefits in the first
instance? Does a union violate its duty of fairly representing all
members of a bargaining unit by trading off retirees benefits for cur-
rent employee wages? What tribunal should determine these issues:
courts, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), arbitrators?
This Article explores these and related legal issues arising from
granting health and welfare benefits to persons who have retired
from active employment. The combination of extraordinary advances
in both medical science and medical costs has resulted in an increas-
ingly large number of senior citizens in need of assistance, beyond
federal Medicare programs,' in meeting the expenses of adequate
medical care. Unfortunately, these escalating needs occur while
1. According to speakers at a recent workshop on health care negotiations: "Ac-
tuarial trends, coupled with rising medical costs, mean that the unfunded liabilities of
health and welfare plans may dwarf those of pension plans. . . ." Estimates range from
$98 billion up to $2 trillion in unfunded health and welfare plan liability, and the
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many employers are currently fighting for economic survival in the
face of domestic deregulation, foreign competition, and the challenge
of technological innovation. The confluence of these circumstances
has given rise to several legal issues, some of which have been incon-
sistently resolved by courts and other tribunals. Congress also has
taken an increasing interest in trying to resolve these problems, so
far with only stop-gap measures. Careful analysis is timely and
needed. Hopefully, this Article can contribute to that end.
BARGAINING BENEFITS FOR RETIRED EMPLOYEES
Employers and the labor organizations that represent their em-
ployees have a statutory duty to bargain with one another on
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."2 The
Supreme Court has held that such matters are mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining about which either party may insist on its pro-
posals to the point of impasse, and back up its insistence by eco-
nomic action such as a strike by the union or a lockout by the em-
ployer.3 In addition, an employer who modifies an existing
employment term or practice which is a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining, without bargaining with the union or establishing that the
union waived its right to bargain concerning that subject, commits
an unfair labor practice in violation of its duty to bargain in good
faith imposed by section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations
problem will become worse as the number of retirees grows and they live longer
after retirement .... Actuarial trends indicate that retirees will make up an
increasingly larger segment of the overall population, meaning that more retir-
ees will be supported by proportionally fewer active employees .... Cutbacks
in Medicare by the federal government mean that health insurance costs in-
creasingly are being shifted to the private sector, adding to the burden on
health and welfare plans that cover retirees .... Providing health care cover-
age for retirees poses a huge problem for such plans both because of the rising
number of retirees and the increasing cost of health care .... [O]ver the past
10 years, medical price increases generally have outpaced increases in overall
consumer prices. In 1986, medical prices are projected to increase at a rate
more than four times faster than the projected increase in overall prices.
5 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS WEEKLY (BNA) 27-28 (Jan. 5, 1987).
The advantages and disadvantages of the Medicare program are beyond the scope of
this Article, but it is relevant to note that Medicare has been criticized as not adequately
meeting the health care needs of retired workers in terms of eligibility, coverage of all
health care expenses, and required supplemental payments.
2. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, §§ 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), 8(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1982) [hereinafter NLRA].
3. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348 (1958); see
R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 431-33, 496 (1976); 1 C. MORRIS. THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW 629-34, 760-63, 770 (2d ed. 1983).
Act (NLRA).'
In Allied Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass,5 the Su-
preme Court held that an employer did not commit an unfair labor
practice by unilaterally changing insurance benefits previously nego-
tiated for already retired workers because retired workers were not
"employees" within the meaning of the NLRA. Thus, benefits for
previously retired workers were not mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing and employers were not obliged to bargain over them with the
union.
Nevertheless, collective "bargaining over pensioners' rights has be-
come an established industrial practice."' The apparent anomaly of
a practice of common bargaining over a subject on which bargaining
is not required can exist within the law because the Supreme Court
has adopted a classification of potential collective bargaining sub-
jects as (1) mandatory - over which parties must bargain, at least
when one party invokes the subject; (2) permissive - over which
parties may, but need not, bargain; and (3) illegal - over which
parties may not bargain without breaking the law.7 Health and wel-
fare benefits for already retired workers fall into the second cate-
gory.8 It is a subject about which unions and employers need not, but
often do, bargain.
By contrast, issues regarding health and welfare, as well as pen-
sion, benefits which currently active workers will receive when they
retire are considered mandatory subjects of bargaining.9 This hold-
ing is consistent with the Court's interpretation of the definition of
"employee" as one who is currently working,'0 and whose benefits -
even upon and after retirement - must be negotiated upon request
of either party.11 Such benefits are regarded as a form of compensa-
tion, the receipt of which has been delayed until after retirement,
and are in lieu of additional current income. 12 Retired employees,
however, by definition, have ceased to work for, and have no expec-
4. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964);
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); see also R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 439-42, 455-
66; 1 C. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 563-66.
5. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
6. Id. at 175-76, 182; see also infra note 37 and accompanying text.
7. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). See gen-
erally R. GORMAN, supra note 3. at 496-531; 1 C. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 757-869.
8. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 171 n.11, 176, 181 n.20, 187-88; 1 C.
MORRIS, supra note 3, at 764-65, 779.
9. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 180; see also Bastian-Blessing, Div. of
Golconda Corp. v. NLRB, 474 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1973); 1 C. MORRIS, supra note 3, at
777-86.
10. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 166-68.
11. Id. at 180.
12. Id. at 180-81; accord Malone v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension
Trust, 110 Cal. App. 3d 538, 544, 168 Cal. Rptr. 210, 213 (1980).
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tation of further employment with, their former employer.1 3 Conse-
quently, any addition to their retirement benefits beyond that negoti-
ated or granted while they were active employees would not be a
term or condition of their prior employment nor bargained in ex-
change for wages that might have otherwise been earned while they
were active employees.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that current employees
have no interest in whether health and welfare benefits are increased
or decreased for retired employees. A number of businesses and un-
ions recognize that the availability of such benefits upon retirement
makes employment more attractive. Indeed, these benefits are some-
times used as an incentive to encourage early retirement - a not
insignificant consideration to a company that wants to decrease costs
(and perhaps increase productivity) by replacing highly compensated
older employees with lower paid younger ones.
The distinction between benefits bargained for active employees to
take effect upon or after their retirement and benefits granted for the
first time to a former worker after retirement is not only key to the
classification of the former as a mandatory subject of bargaining and
the latter as a permissive one, but was also relied upon by the Su-
preme Court in rationalizing potential inconsistencies between the
definition of employee for purposes of collective bargaining and for
purposes of employee trust funds established under another provision
of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).14
Section 302 of the LMRA prohibits any payment by an employer
to a representative of its employees except for limited specified pur-
poses including, under subsection (c)(5), payments "to a trust fund
established by such representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit
of the employees of such employer, and their families and depen-
dents . . .., The Supreme Court noted, apparently with ap-
proval,16 Blassie v. Kroger Co., 1 an earlier Eighth Circuit decision
that "employees" under section 302(c)(5) include current employees
as well as persons who were current employees when the trust was
established but are now retired. The Court went on, however, to
state that the rationale of the Blassie case was that retirees remain
eligible for benefits of trust funds which were established during
13. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 167-68.
14. Id. at 169-71; Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 302(c)(5),
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) [hereinafter LMRA].
15. LMRA § 302(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (a)(5) (1982).
16. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 169.
17. 345 F.2d 58, 70 (8th Cir. 1965) (Blackmun, J.).
their active employment."8
As so interpreted, Blassie, and its approval by the Court, could be
read as limiting to eligible retirees under a section 302(c)(5) trust
only those for whom the trust was established while they were active
employees. This interpretation, although inconsistent with some
broader dicta in Pittsburgh Plate Glass that "nothing we hold today
precludes permissive bargaining over the benefits of already retired
employees,"' 1 is consistent with the holding in Blassie which re-
versed a district court ruling that all retired employees were ineligi-
ble beneficiaries of benefits granted to them after retirement.
20
According to Blassie a retired person who was an active employee
at the time that a health and welfare trust was established, and to
which his employer contributed on his behalf, continues to be an em-
ployee under the trust after retirement, and may be the recipient of
benefits different in amount, and probably in kind, than those pro-
vided during his active employment. Nor is his employment status
and benefit eligibility lost because he is required to pay, or volunta-
rily pays, or has paid on his behalf by some entity other than his
employer, additional premiums to maintain a desired level of benefits
under the trust.
Other courts also have concluded that retirees are employees
under LMRA section 302(c)(5), although not under NLRA section
2(3).21 The Ninth Circuit, for example, reversed a district court
holding that retired employees could not receive medical and hospi-
talization benefits paid for by current assessments against an em-
ployer rather than out of an accumulated surplus in the health and
welfare trust fund.22 The court of appeals stated that there was noth-
ing in the language or purpose of section 302(c)(5) which would re-
18. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 169-70.
19. Id. at 171 n.11.
20. Kroger Co. v. Blassie, 225 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Mo. 1964), vacated, 345 F.2d
58 (8th Cir. 1965). The district court decision is criticized, persuasively, in Goetz, Em-
ployee Benefit Trusts Under Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 59
Nw. U.L. Rav. 719, 734-36 (1965). The court of appeals stated:
We conclude that . . . a person for whom employer contributions are made
prior to retirement is not barred from receiving benefits of the Trust after re-
tirement, and that this qualification is not nullified by additional contributions
made by him or by others on his behalf. We also conclude, however, that a
person for whom employer contributions are not made prior to retirement is not
entitled under the statute to benefits of the Trust after retirement, and that this
disqualification is not cured by contributions made by him or by others on his
behalf.
Blassie, 345 F.2d at 68.
21. See, e.g., Toensing v. Brown, 374 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Cal. 1974), af'd, 528
F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1975); Local No. 688, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Townsend,
345 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1965); Crawford v. Cianciulli, 357 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Garvison v. Jensen, 355 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1966).
22. Jensen v. Garvison, 241 F. Supp. 523 (D. Ore. 1965), rev'd, 355 F.2d 487
(9th Cir. 1966).
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quire that such benefits be financed by employer contributions made
during the period of an employee's active service rather than by cur-
rent employer payments to the trust fund.23
By implication, a more recent Supreme Court decision24 removes
any doubt as to permissible health and welfare trust fund coverage
of retirees. Medical insurance coverage had been extended under a
trust fund to widows of coal miners and of retired miners. The par-
ties, by their collective bargaining agreement, subsequently extended
lifetime benefits to widows of already retired miners, but more lim-
ited benefits to widows of miners who were eligible to retire but were
still working at the time of their death. The latter class of widows
sued claiming unlawful discrimination under LMRA section
302(c)(5). In rejecting this challenge, the Court noted that payments
to such trust funds must be for the sole and exclusive benefit of em-
ployees of employers making the payments, and for their families
and dependents, and concluded that: "None of the conditions places
any restriction on the allocation of the funds among the persons pro-
tected by section 302(c)(5). '25 Thus, the Court did not question that
retired workers, and their dependents, as well as active employees,
and their dependents, were among the persons for whom health and
welfare trusts may be provided under LMRA section 302(c)(5).
Nor does the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), 28 place any restriction on including already retired work-
ers as beneficiaries of health and welfare trusts. ERISA, which was
intended to protect the retirement expectations of employees, pro-
vides that a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan must discharge his
duties "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries
... ,,2" A "participant" is defined in ERISA as "any employee or
former employee of an employer"'28 and, thus, clearly includes retir-
ees as former employees. A "beneficiary" is defined as "a person des-
ignated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit
plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder. ' 29 Ac-
cordingly, trustees under an employee benefit plan must act in the
interests of, among others, retired employees and beneficiaries whom
23. Garvison, 355 F.2d at 488.
24. United Mine Workers Health and Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S.
562 (1982) [hereinafter UMW Plan].
25. Id. at 572.
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
27. Id. § 1104(a)(1).
28. Id. § 1002(7). See 1 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) 11 2427, 2481 (1986).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1982).
they may designate.
Under other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, it also is
clear that retirees are treated as employees for purposes of employer
deductions for contributions on behalf of retired employees to a qual-
ified benefit plan,30 and such retirees can exclude the value of most
such contributions from their personal income tax liability. 31
That retired persons can be employees for purposes of becoming
beneficiaries of health and welfare trusts, but not employees for pur-
poses of bargaining such benefits, is neither nonsensical nor novel.
The definition of an "employee" correctly and commonly has been
held to vary with the purposes of the law being construed. 2 Al-
though, as noted in Blassie,"3 retired persons were not specifically
mentioned in the congressional debates leading to the enactment of
LMRA section 302(c)(5), the proviso to that subsection requires
that the employers' payments be held in trust for the benefit of em-
ployees, their families and dependents, to provide medical or hospital
care, compensation for injuries, illness, or unemployment, pensions
on retirement or death, or insurance to provide such protection.
3 4
The Blassie court rightly observed that: "Misfortune of this kind is
not confined to the active employee. It strikes the retired one as well
and, because of his age, with greater frequency."' 5 The court re-
jected the inference that the failure to mention retired persons indi-
cates an intent to deprive them of such benefits, and concluded that
"the opposite inference - that they are not mentioned because no
one conceived them to be excluded - is reasonable."38 It would cer-
tainly be ironic if a statute which contemplates the enjoyment of cer-
tain benefits after an employee's retirement excluded such a person
from its protections. Thus, the Eighth Circuit observed that the
"trend of welfare plans toward the inclusion of retired persons is a
fact of today's industrial life."37
30. 26 U.S.C. § 79 (1982); Rev. Rul. 68-577, 1968-2 C.B. 50; Treas. Reg. 1.79-
l(b)(1)(ii) (as amended 1983); Rev. Rul. 74-281, 1974-1 C.B. 133; see 3 Pens. Plan
Guide (CCH) 1 11,232 (1986); 5 id. 1 18,678 (1975). See infra note 31.
31. 26 U.S.C. § 401(c)(1)(B), (h) (1982); Treas. Reg. 401-14 (as amended
1964); Rev. Rul. 62-194, 1962-2 C.B. 57. But see Rev. Rul. 75-539, 1975-2 C.B. 46
(cash payments upon retirement are taxable). See 3 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) 11 11,205,
11,700-14 (1979); 5 id. 118,431 (1975). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 has not changed
the basic conclusions stated although it and prior legislation has tightened tax deductions
and exemptions. Pub. L. No. 99-514 §§ 1151, 1827, 1852(h), 100 Stat. 4810 (1986).
32. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 166-74; NLRB v. Hearst Publi-
cations, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Darden v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701 (4th
Cir. 1986).
33. Blassie, 345 F.2d at 70.
34. Id.; LMRA § 302(c)(5)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(A) (1982).
35. Blassie, 345 F.2d at 70.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 69; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text; Note, Pension Plans
and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 904, 915 (1970).
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MODIFICATION OR TERMINATION OF RETIREE BENEFITS
Once it is agreed to include retired workers within a health and
welfare plan, is there any legal restriction on employers or trustees
eliminating or reducing benefits for economic or other reasons?
Whether previously granted health and welfare benefits for retirees
may become vested, and thus protected from reduction or termina-
tion during the life of the retiree, depends both upon potential legal
and contractual requirements. On this, the authorities agree; on
whether such vesting has taken place in particular situations, the
cases present more confusion than consensus.
Potential Legal Restrictions
ERISA and LMRA
Potential legal requirements are sometimes said to exist in LMRA
section 302(c)(5) and various provisions of ERISA. In general, how-
ever, it has been held that these statutory provisions do not restrict
the right of parties to a collective agreement, trustees of a health and
welfare trust, or a nonunionized employer from terminating or modi-
fying in a reasonable manner health and welfare benefits previously
granted to retired workers.3 8
There is a clear distinction in ERISA between the protection of
employee expectations to receive pension plan benefits and health
and welfare plan benefits. ERISA defines an employee welfare bene-
fit plan as one which includes provisions for medical, surgical, or
hospital care benefits, and excludes "pensions on retirement or death,
and insurance to provide such pensions." 39 A "pension plan" or "em-
ployee pension benefit plan" is defined as a plan, fund, or program
providing retirement or deferred income for employees, and may ex-
clude supplemental income payments to retirees based upon in-
38. See cases cited infra notes 46, 58, 110-14, 151; White Farm Equip. Co. v.
White Motor Corp., 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986); Turner v. Local Union No. 302,
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979); Metal Polishers Local
No. 11 v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc. 538 F. Supp. 368, 374 (S.D. Ohio 1982); San Diego Floor
Coverers Joint Ins. Trust (1983 unpublished arbitration) (Weckstein, Arb.). Participants
must be given timely notice of modifications. See Palino v. Casey, 664 F.2d 854, 859 (Ist
Cir. 1981); Pierce v. NECA-IBEW Welfare Fund, 488 F. Supp. 559, 564-65 (E.D.
Tenn. 1978), a ffd on opinion below, 620 F.2d 589 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1015 (1980); Pete v. United Mine Workers Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 517
F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (pension plan); Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d 744, 748-
49 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 964 (1964) (pension plan).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982).
creases in the cost of living after retirement.40
The Act requires vesting of a pension plan4 1 but expressly excludes
employee welfare benefit plans, or health and welfare plans, from the
vesting requirements.42 Likewise, pension plans, but not health and
welfare plans, are made nonforfeitable 3 and are covered by
ERISA's plan termination insurance requirements44 to safeguard
against pension plan defaults. These distinctions are intended both to
recognize the dependence of health and welfare plans upon variable
funding through contributions of employers and to safeguard the as-
sets of pension funds.45
These vesting differences between pension plans and health and
welfare plans have been recognized and applied by courts under
ERISA as well as section 302(c)(5) of the LMRA. 46 Both of these
statutes require that plans subject to their provisions be managed for
the sole and exclusive benefit of the participants and their
beneficiaries.
In Turner v. Local Union No. 302, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,47 a fund had been previously established by parties to a
collective bargaining agreement to provide medical and hospital ben-
efits for employees who retired after the initiation of the fund. The
40. Such increases could be part of an employee welfare benefit plan. Id. §
1002(2).
41. Id. §§ 1051-1053, as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, 100 Stat. 4810 (1986).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1). As the Seventh Circuit has stated "welfare benefits do
not become vested until a claim arises that is payable under the Plan; these benefits are
contractual rights subject to amendment by the parties to the Agreement." International
Ass'n of Iron Workers Local No. 1l v. Douglas, 646 F.2d 1211, 1215 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 866 (1981).
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(19), 1051(1), 1053.
44. Id. § 1321(a)(1).
45. Thus, the report to the House of Representatives on ERISA states:
The term 'accrued benefit' refers to pension or retirement benefits and is not
intended to apply to certain ancillary benefits, such as medical insurance or life
insurance, which are sometimes provided for employees in conjunction with a
pension plan, and are sometimes provided separately. To require the vesting of
these ancillary benefits would seriously complicate the administration and in-
crease the cost of plans whose primary function is to provide retirement
income.
H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4670,
4726.
46. See, e.g., Molnar v. Wibbelt, 789 F.2d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 1986); see also cases
cited supra note 38, infra note 146; Turner v. Local Union No. 302, International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 604 F.2d at 1225, 1226 (1979); Pierce v. NECA-IBEW Welfare Trust
Fund, 488 F. Supp. 559, 564 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), a~fd on opinion below, 620 F.2d 589
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980); Thonen v. McNeil-Akron, 6 Pens. Plan
Guide (CCH) I 23,714B (N.D. Ohio 1986); Gutting v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 541 F.
Supp. 345, 347 (E.D. Mo. 1982); Petrella v. NL Indus., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1357, 1365-
66 (D.N.J. 1982); Weiss v. United Whelan Corp., 158 N.Y.L.J. 17, 2 Pens. Plan Guide
(CCH) % 7004 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
47. 604 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979).
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fund trustees subsequently reduced the benefits for retirees pursuant
to an amended agreement of the parties authorizing the trustees to
determine the level of benefits within the limits of funds available for
that purpose.
Previously covered retirees brought a class action seeking restora-
tion of eliminated and reduced benefits. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the
unions and employers.48 Rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that
prior benefits had become vested retirement rights that could not be
amended without their consent, the court held that, unlike pension
benefits which are paid from an actuarially predetermined fund and
are guaranteed for the life of the pensioner, health and welfare bene-
fits "are negotiated periodically and are paid from a fund consisting
of employer contributions and last only the life of the collective bar-
gaining agreement."4' The Turner court noted that ERISA distin-
guished between pension plans, which must meet participation, bene-
fit accrual and vesting requirements based on age and length of
service, and employee welfare benefit plans which do not have to
meet such requirements, and "were not vested property rights but
were instead contractual rights subject to amendment by the parties
to the agreement." 50
Thus in Turner, the reduction of retiree health and welfare bene-
fits had been brought about by financial problems attributable to
changes in the industry. Under these circumstances, stated the court,
the "sole and exclusive benefit of the employees" provision of
LMRA section 302(c)(5) was not violated because
there is no intimation of bribery, extortion, or union misuse of funds that
would strike at the purposes of section 302, and an amended rule is adopted
by trustees in their legitimate interest of protecting the 'long term viability'
of the fund and the trust fund is not used for the benefit of anyone other
than employees of contributing employers .... 51
ERISA also requires that fiduciaries52 of an employee benefit fund
exercise the care and skill that "a prudent man" would exercise
under like circumstances, 53 that the plan be managed in accordance
with governing documents, 54 and that those provisions not be arbi-
48. Id. at 1222, 1223-24.
49. Id. at 1225.
50. Id. at 1226.
51. Id. at 1228.
52. Who include employers, unions and their appointed trustees.
53. 29 U.S.C. § I104(1)(B) (1982). See generally Maldonado, Fiduciary Re-
sponsibilities Under ERISA, 2 LAB. LAW. 819 (1986).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(1)(D) (1982).
trary, capricious, 55 or discriminate in favor of shareholders, officers,
or highly compensated employees.58 Thus, any granting or modifica-
tion of health and welfare benefits, whether of retired or active em-
ployees, may not run counter to these requirements. A reduction in
the period of "extended benefits", that is the time in which an em-
ployee who has been covered by health and welfare benefits remains
eligible for such benefits after an employer ceases to make contribu-
tions to a plan on his behalf (because of employment termination or
otherwise), by trustees with discretion to conserve the trusts assets
has been held not to violate these standards nor those of the
LMRA. 17
Likewise, the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Robin-
son (UMW Plan), discussed earlier,58 found no violation of law
where an agreement granted more extensive health and welfare in-
surance benefits to widows of retired miners than to widows of min-
ers eligible to retire but still working at the time of their death. The
trust documents limited the discretion of the fund trustees by requir-
ing them to implement the benefit levels fixed in the collective bar-
gaining agreement, unless they were in violation of federal law. The
Court held that the trustees' actions were not to be judged by any
common-law standard of "reasonableness." '59 The modification of
benefits would be upheld so long as the trustees' actions and the col-
lective bargaining agreement giving rise to them did not violate
ERISA, the NLRA, or other provisions of federal law such as rules
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, religion or sex. 0°
Thus, in the UMW Plan case, it was permissible to vary the allo-
cation of benefits among different classes of persons protected by
LMRA section 302(c)(5), employees (including retired employees),
their families and dependents, in the language of the Court, "be-
cause finite contributions must be allocated among potential benefi-
ciaries, inevitably financial and actuarial considerations sometimes
will provide the only justification for an eligibility condition that dis-
55. See Rosen v. Hotel Employees Union of Philadelphia, Local 274, 637 F.2d
592, 596 (3d Cir. 1981); Toensing v. Brown, 528 F.2d 69, 72 (9th Cir. 1975); Petrella v.
NL Indus., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1357, 1366-67, 1368 (D.N.J. 1982); see also Pete v.
United Mine Workers Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 517 F.2d 1275, 1283 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (en banc) (LMRA § 302(c)(5)); Malone v. Western Conference of Teamsters
Pension Trust, 110 Cal. App. 3d 538, 168 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1980).
56. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(4) (1982); see also supra note 30 & 31 and accompany-
ing text.
57. International Ass'n of Iron Workers, Local No. 11I v. Douglas, 646 F.2d
1211 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 866 (1981); Pierce v. NECA-IBEW Welfare
Trust Fund, 620 F.2d 589 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980).
58. UMW Plan, 455 U.S. 562 (1982). See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying
text.
59. UMW Plan, 455 U.S. at 574.
60. Id. at 575.
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criminates between different classes of potential applicants for bene-fits."'1 Such allocations were especially defensible when they were
made, as there, as part of a complex collective agreement reached to
settle a strike (over other issues).
As the UMW Plan Court noted, benefit plans sometimes discrimi-
nate in favor of active employees as compared to retired workers.62
That type of discrimination was challenged in Toensing v. Brown6
when the trustees increased pension benefits for active employees in
a greater amount than for already retired workers. The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed a summary judgment for the trustees, holding that the
adoption of such differential was a permissible act of discretion by
the trustees, relying, inter alia, upon Pittsburgh Plate Glass,4 hold-
ing that the subject of retiree benefits was only a permissive subject
of collective bargaining whereas benefits for active employees was a
mandatory subject. The implication also is clear that a cutting or
termination of health and welfare benefits for retirees while main-
taining those for active employees is not a violation of LMRA sec-
tion 302(c)(5) or ERISA. 5 It might be contended, however, that
such discrimination may give rise to a breach of other duties of em-
ployers or unions under the NLRA.
The Duty to Bargain and the Duty of Fair Representation
The Pittsburgh Plate Glass case suggests that if an employer ter-
minates or cuts retiree health and welfare benefits, without bargain-
ing with the union, the employer has not violated its duty to bargain
in good faith. If the employer does bargain, and the union agrees to
cut retiree benefits while maintaining those for active employees, the
Court also suggested that the union has not breached its duty of fair
representation, stating:
Having once found it advantageous to bargain for improvements in pension-
ers' benefits, active workers are not forever bound to that view or obliged to
negotiate on behalf of retirees again. To the contrary, they are free to de-
cide, for example, that current income is preferable to greater certainty in
their own retirement benefits or, indeed, to their retirement benefits
altogether."8
61. Id.
62. Id. at 574-75.
63. 528 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1975).
64. See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
65. Toensing v. Brown, 528 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1975).
66. The Court continued:
By advancing petitioners' [the retirees'] interests now, active employees, there-
fore, have no assurance that they will be the beneficiaries of similar representa-
An inference from the Court's holding that retirees are no longer
members of the bargaining unit is that the union has no duty of fair
representation of already retired workers.6 7 Thus, after a footnote
reference to an early case on the "duty of fair representation," the
Court states: "But whatever its theory, the case obviously does not
require a union affirmatively to represent nonbargaining unit mem-
bers or to take into account their interests in making bona fide eco-
nomic decisions in behalf of those whom it does represent." 8
A duty to represent all members of a bargaining unit without dis-
crimination, arbitrariness, or bad faith 9 is more likely to be
breached if the union is too solicitous of retirees' concerns at the
expense of the interests of active workers. Indeed, one argument for
considering retirees' benefits as a mandatory subject of bargaining,
although rejected by the Court, was that such benefits vitally affect
the terms and conditions of employment of active employees, for ex-
ample, by decreasing the availability of funds for the current work-
ers.7 0 The Court seemed to regard this as a reason for not requiring
the union to represent retirees along with current employees because
of "the potential for severe internal conflicts," and suggested that
"the union would be bound to balance the interests of all its constitu-
ents, with the result that the interests of active employees might at
times be preferred to those of retirees. '"71
Somewhat ironically, the Second Circuit held recently in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding that an employer's attempted modificaiton of an
existing collective bargaining agreement to eliminate benefits for re-
tirees was a mandatory subject of bargaining.7 2 The court recognized
that the cost of benefits for the retirees would significantly reduce
the availability of funds for current jobs and wages and would vitally
tion when they retire. The insurance against future contingencies that they buy
in negotiating benefits for retirees is thus a hazardous and, therefore, improba-
ble investment, far different from a cost-of-living escalation clause that they
could contractually enforce in court.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. at 181-82.
67. See Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 727 F.2d 177, 181-84 (8th Cir.
1984); United Auto Workers v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1486 n.16 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984); Toensing v. Brown, 528 F.2d 69, 72 (9th Cir.
1975). Compare Dwyer v. Climatrol Indus., Inc., 544 F.2d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1976)
(union duty to negotiate plant closing agreement).
68. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 181 n.20. The court also referred to an
article on the subject.
69. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Local 12, Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312, enforced,
368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Miranda Fuel Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); see also 1 C.
MORRIS, supra note 3, at 1285-1358; R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 695-728.
70. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 176-82.
71. Id. at 173 n.12.
72. Century Brass Prod., Inc. v. United Auto Workers, 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.
1986).
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affect the rights of active employees. The court went on to hold,
however, that although the retirees were employees for purposes of
the Bankruptcy Code and generally could have a union as an author-
ized representative thereunder, the conflict of interest between cur-
rent and retired employees precluded the union from representing
the latter group and the bankruptcy court should appoint another
representative for the retirees.73
While this last case distinguished Pittsburgh Plate Glass for pur-
poses of the bankruptcy proceeding, 4 the Supreme Court's holding
that benefits of already retired workers are not mandatory subjects
of bargaining also allows an employer to unilaterally alter the health
insurance benefits of retired workers without committing an unfair
labor practice. The Court stated that "just as section 8(d) defines
the obligation to bargain to be with respect to mandatory terms
alone, so it prescribes the duty to maintain only mandatory terms
without unilateral modification for the duration of the collective-bar-
gaining agreement. 17 5 Furthermore, "[b]y once bargaining and
agreeing on a permissive subject, the parties, naturally, do not make
the subject a mandatory topic of future bargaining. 1 76 Therefore, the
employer was free to modify a permissive term, such as health and
welfare benefits for already retired workers, without any obligation
under the NLRA to bargain with the union concerning the modifica-
tion. "The remedy for a unilateral mid-term modification to a per-
missive term," suggested the Court, "lies in an action for breach of
contract . . . not in an unfair labor-practice proceeding."' 7" The
reach and ramifications of that remedy will now be explored.
Contractual Limitations on Termination of Retiree Health and
Welfare Benefits
In rejecting the claim that an employer commits an unfair labor
practice by unilaterally reducing retiree medical benefits, the Su-
preme Court indicated that this did not mean that the retirees are
without protection. The retired workers could invoke common-law
contract rights or those provided by federal law for enforcement of
collective bargaining contracts. As stated by the Court: "Under es-
73. Id. at 275-76.
74. Id. at 274-75.
75. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 185-86; see also Connecticut Light &
Power Co. v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1973).
76. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 187.
77. Id. at 188.
tablished contract principles, vested retirement rights may not be al-
tered without the pensioner's consent . . . . The retiree, moreover,
would have a federal remedy under section 301 of the LMRA for
breach of contract if his benefits were unilaterally changed. '7 8
These methods of attack have met with mixed success. The availa-
bility of contractual remedies has not been questioned; only the exis-
tence and extent of a claimed contractual commitment.
Forums for the Enforcement of Contract Claims
Several legal remedies are available for a retiree seeking to assert
a contractual claim to continuing health and welfare benefits. If the
benefits have been established by a collective bargaining agreement,
that agreement will most likely also contain a grievance arbitration
provision. Although no longer an active employee, and not a member
of the bargaining unit, the retiree could request the union to file a
grievance with the employer contesting the termination or reduction
of his benefits. Upon rejection of this grievance by the employer, the
union could invoke arbitration by an impartial third party, even in
situations where the collective bargaining agreement has expired be-
cause the right being arbitrated had already arisen under the agree-
ment prior to its termination.79 Decisions of labor arbitrators may be
enforced by state or federal courts exercising very limited judicial
review. 80
Either the union or the retirees would have standing to sue under
section 301 of the LMRA to enforce a benefits for retirees provision
in a collective bargaining agreement. 81 Such a suit may be brought
in a federal or state court, but federal law would govern in either
78. Id. at 181 n.20.
79. See, e.g., Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Work-
ers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 252-53 (1977); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, & Local
No. 22 v. Nanco Elec., Inc., 790 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1986); Hotel & Restaurant Employ-
ees, Local 703 v. Williams, 752 F.2d 1476, 1478 (9th Cir. 1985); Textile Workers, Local
129 v. Columbia Mills, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); Johnston Group, Inc.,
86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8503, at 5119 (Jan. 16, 1986) (Cole, Arb.). For one
view of the advantages and disadvantages of the use of arbitration for retiree benefit
cases, see Barnes & Mishkind, Retiree Health and Welfare Benefits: Controversy Over
Their Duration, 10 EMPLOYEE REL L.J. 584, 600, 613 n.20 (1985).
80. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
New Meiji Mkt. v. United Food & Comm. Workers Local 905, 789 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir.
1986). See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 584-86; St. Antoine, Judicial Review
of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977); Note, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Con-
tinuing Problems of Power and Finality, 23 UCLA L. REV. 936 (1976).
81. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 181 n.20; Smith v. Evening News Ass'n.,371 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1962); United Auto Workers v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476,
1484-86 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1984); Turner v. Local Union No.
302, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219, 1224 n.4 (9th Cir. 1979); United
Auto Workers v. Acme Precision Prod., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 537, 540 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
But cf. Barnes & Mishkind, supra note 79, at 598-99.
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forum. 2 Since retirees are not members of the bargaining unit, and
the union is not obligated to bargain on their behalf, the union may,
but is not required to, process their grievance. Consequently, the nor-
mal requirement that parties exhaust their contractual grievance and
arbitration procedure before commencing suit may not apply to re-
tirees.8 3 When a group of retirees is similarly impacted by a change
in benefits, class actions may be certified on their behalf.8 4
If the reduction or termination of benefits was not directly accom-
plished by the employer, but effected by the trustees of a health and
welfare plan, the trustees may be sued for breach of their duties
under common law, ERISA, LMRA section 302(c)(5), or the trust
instruments themselves.85 Not infrequently, the trustees, half having
been appointed by the union, and half by the employer, will deadlock
on voting on a benefit increase or decrease issue, and an impartial
umpire, or arbitrator, will be appointed to resolve the deadlock.86 Al-
though the trustees are not representatives of their appointing party
82. Local 174, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95
(1962). A question has been raised as to whether the retirees would have a common-law
contract right under state law in addition to, and not preempted by, federal law. See
Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669, 675 n.7 (6th Cir. 1985).
83. Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 727 F.2d 177, 180-85 (8th Cir.
1984); see also Local Union No. 150-A, United Food & Comm. Workers, Int'l Union v.
Dubuque Packing Co., 756 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1985); Metal Polishers, Int'l Union v.
Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 642 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1981).
Compare Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2706, 2707-11 (N.D.
Ala.), affd, 704 F.2d 361 (11th Cir. 1983) (challenge to plant closing agreement by
discharged employees). But see Johnston Group, Inc., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1
8503, at 5117-18 (Jan. 16, 1986) (Cole, Arb. 1986); Anderson, 727 F.2d at 185-87
(Bright, J., dissenting).
84. E.g., UMW Plan, 455 U.S. 562 (1982); Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co.,
770 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1202 (1986); District 17, United
Mine Workers v. Allied Corp., 735 F.2d 121, 123 (4th Cir. 1984); Turner v. Local Union
No. 302, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979); see Weimer v.
Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Barnes & Mishkind,
supra note 79, at 599.
85. ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1982); LMRA § 301(a)(b), 29
U.S.C. § 185(a)(b) (1982). See, e.g., District 17, United Mine Workers v. Allied Corp.,
735 F.2d 121, 130-34 (4th Cir. 1984); International Ass'n of Iron Workers, Local No.
111 v. Douglas, 646 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 866 (1981); Toensing v.
Brown, 528 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1975); Pierce v. NECA-IBEW Welfare Trust Fund, 488
F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), aff/d, 620 F.2d 589 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1015 (1980).
There is a question, however, of the standing of a union or another trust fund to sue
trustees of a fund under ERISA. See Northeast Dept., ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund
v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 152-54 (3d Cir. 1985).
86. LMRA § 302(c)(5)(B), 29 U.S.C. 186(c)(5)(B)(1982). See, e.g., Hawkins v.
Bennett, 704 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir., 1983); San Diego Floor Coverers Joint Ins. Trust
(1983 unpublished arbitration) (Weckstein, Arb.).
and must exercise the prudent discretion of a fiduciary,8 1 they will
often tend to reflect the perspective of the party who appointed
them.
Fund trustees may also bring an action against an employer who
has unilaterally ceased paying contributions required by a collective
agreement to the fund.88 The Supreme Court has held that trustees,
authorized by the trust instruments to enforce obligations thereun-
der, need not await exhaustion of grievance-arbitration remedies
under the collective agreement. 89 An arbitral remedy on a grievance
filed by the union seeking delinquent employer payments, however, is
not preempted by any public policy embodied in ERISA.90
When a collective contract has expired and an employer contends
that an impasse has been reached in negotiating a new agreement,
thus permitting it to cease making health and welfare fund contribu-
tions, the NLRB has primary jurisdiction to determine whether an
impasse has in fact been reached, and ERISA does not entitle the
fund's trustees to have that labor relations issue determined in a fed-
eral court suit.9 This holding, however, applies to payments on be-
half of active employees, and probably not to payments solely for
retiree benefits, since, as previously observed, even a mid-term modi-
fication of their benefits does not constitute an unlawful refusal to
bargain.9 2 Accordingly, the NLRB normally would not have jurisdic-
tion to determine an employer's obligation regarding retiree health
and welfare benefits since breaches of collective bargaining agree-
ments are not, per se, unfair labor practices. 93
Retired employees whose entitlement to health and welfare bene-
fits is not the result of collective bargaining may also enforce their
alleged contract right to continuing benefits in suits against their for-
mer employers or funds created to administer such plans. 4 Retirees
and their former employers also could voluntarily agree to arbitrate
claims to continuing benefits, subject to the narrow judicial scrutiny
87. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981).
88. See Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364 (1984); see
also Central States v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559 (1985).
89. See Schneider Moving & Storage v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364 (1984).
90. United Auto Workers v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 1400 (7th
Cir. 1986).
91. See U.A. 198 Health & Welfare, Educ. & Pension Funds v. Rester Refriger-
ation Serv., Inc., 790 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1986).
92. See supra notes 5, 64, 75-77 and accompanying text.
93. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 186-87.
94. E.g., White Farms Equip. Co. v. White Motor Corp., 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.
1986); Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1483 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Eardman
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Employee Welfare Benefit Plans, 607 F. Supp. 196 (W.D.N.Y.
1986); Petrella v. NL Indus., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1357 (D.N.J. 1982); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Korneghy, 71 So. 2d 292 (Ala. Ct. App.), pet. for cert. stricken, 71 So. 2d
301 (Ala. 1954); Skeehy v. Seilon, Inc., 10 Ohio St. 2d 242, 227 N.E.2d 229 (1967);
Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226, 271 N.W.2d 879 (1978).
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of commercial arbitrations.95
Proving Contractual Claims
The starting place in proving any contractual right or privilege, of
course, is the language of the contract. Occasionally, a collective
bargaining agreement or other contract will contain an express pro-
vision either clearly giving or denying the right to terminate health
and welfare benefits for retirees. Thus, when a series of collective
bargaining agreements provided that the "employer agrees to main-
tain the benefits in effect . . . throughout the term of this agree-
ment" and the unions and employers amended the last agreement, in
light of a pending shortage of funds, to give the trustees the author-
ity to provide health and welfare benefits within the limits of availa-
ble funds, the contractual right to reduce retiree coverage was
clear.96 Likewise, where a collective agreement expressly provided to
the contrary, that life insurance premiums "for pensioners shall be
paid by the company during the life of the pensioner," it was equally
clear that the employer's obligation extended beyond the term of the
agreement, and even after the employer had closed its plant and
ceased paying insurance premiums for active employees.
97
95. See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 10 (1982); California Arbi-
tration Act, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1280(a), 1281, 1286, 1286.2 (West Supp. 1987);
Siegal v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 89 (2d Cir. 1985). If the contract in question
evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce, federal arbitration law will apply
whether suit is brought in federal or state court. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984).
96. Turner v. Local Union No. 302, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d
1219, 1222-23, 1225, 1226 (9th Cir. 1979) (also upholding the legality of the reduction;
see supra notes 47-51); see also District 17, United Mine Workers v. Allied Corp., 735
F.2d 121, 124, 126 (4th Cir. 1984); United Auto Workers v. Cleveland Gear Corp., 644
F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1983), affid, 746 F.2d 1477 (6th Cir. 1984); United Rubber
Workers v. Lee Nat'l Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Barnes &
Mishkind, supra note 79, at 601, 613 n.21. But see Johnston Group Inc., 86-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 1 8503, at 5119 (Jan. 16, 1986) (Cole, Arb.) (rejecting a claim that a
contract provision that "all the terms of this agreement become null and void as of such
expiration date" extinguished retiree health and welfare benefits previously created under
the agreement).
97. United Steelworkers v. Midvale-Happenstall Co., 676 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1982),
afig, 94 Lab. Cas. (CCH) % 20,940 (W.D. Pa. 1981). That intent would have been made
even more conclusive regarding the language just quoted if the court had considered that
following a strike in which the employer had ceased paying premiums for retirees' life
insurance, the parties substituted the phrase "life of the pensioner" for language in a
prior agreement obligating the employer to pay life insurance premiums "for the term of
this agreement." Stewart & Kelly, Insurance Premiums for Retirees After the Union
Contract Expires, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 521, 525 (1983); see also American Standard, Inc.,
57 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 698, 699-700 (1971) (Warns, Arb.).
Clear language addressed to the employer's right to terminate or
modify its obligation to continue health and welfare benefits for re-
tirees, however, is the exception. And even when it does occur, other
actions or language of the employer may create an ambiguity.98
While analysis properly begins with the contract language, in a col-
lective bargaining situation, especially,99 extrinsic evidence may be
properly admitted to determine the true intention of the parties.100
When a contract is silent as to the duration of employer payments,
or simply provides that they shall "continue," it is unclear whether
the obligation continues only for the life of the agreement or for the
life of the retiree, and resort to extrinsic evidence is desirable. 101
The nature of extrinsic evidence, for example, which has been re-
ferred to by courts and arbitrators in support of a holding that re-
tiree health and welfare benefits have become vested, or cannot be
reduced or terminated by an employer or trustees, has included: (1)
written or oral promises by responsible persons to continue payments
for the life of the pensioner,102 surviving spouse or dependent chil-
98. See, e.g., Johnston Group, Inc., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) at 5118-20(Jan. 16, 1986) (Cole, Arb.) (noting that each party claimed the contract language
unambiguously supported its position [a view of language clarity which the arbitrator did
not share] and contended that no extrinsic evidence was needed, but each introduced
such evidence, which was considered by the arbitrator); see also Great AtI. & Pac. Tea
Co., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 125 (1976) (Seitz, Arb.).
99. It is generally recognized that collective bargaining agreements should be in-
terpreted in light of their content as a generalized code for industrial governance and not
restricted by common-law contract doctrines. See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,
376 U.S. 543 (1964); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.574 (1960); Hendricks v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 696 F.2d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1983). But
see Barnes & Mishkind, supra note 79, at 602.
100. See, e.g., Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1202 (1986); Local Union No. 150-A, United Food Comm.Workers Int'l Union v. Dubuque Packing Co., 756 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1985); United Auto
Workers v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007(1984); United Auto Workers v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 288, 300 (W.D. Mich.
1983); Stewart & Kelly, supra note 97, at 524-26, 530-31, 533-34; see also White Farm
Equip. Co. v. White Farm Motor Corp., 788 F.2d 1186, 1191-95 (6th Cir. 1986)(noncollective bargaining contract); Stewart & Kelly, supra note 97, at 525.
101. See, e.g., Local Union No. 150-A, United Food & Comm. Workers Int'lUnion v. Dubuque Packing Co., 756 F.2d 66, 69 (8th Cir. 1985); United Auto Workers
v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 288, 298, 300 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Roxbury Carpet
Co., 73-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) t 8521, at 4937 (Oct. 26, 1973) (Summers, Arb.);
cf., Upholsterers' Int'l Union v. American Pad & Textile Co., 372 F.2d 427, 428 (6thCir. 1967). That decision is criticized for limiting its inquiry to the contract language, in
Stewart & Kelly, supra note 97.
102. E.g., Local Union No. 150-A, United Food Comm. Workers Int'l Union v.Dubuque Packing Co., 756 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1985); United Auto Workers v. Cadillac
Malleable Iron Co., Inc., 728 F.2d 807, 808-09 (6th Cir. 1984); Bower v. Bunker Hill
Co., 725 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1984). But see District 17, United Mine Workers
v. Allied Corp., 735 F.2d 121, 129-30 (4th Cir. 1984) affid on rehearing, 765 F.2d 412(4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3527 (1985); Turner v. Local Union No. 302,
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1979); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Korneghy, 71 So. 2d 292, 295 (Ala. Ct. App.), petition for cert. stricken, 71So. 2d 301 (Ala. 1954). The absence of such promises in relevant communications can be
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dren,103 or to a specific time beyond the expiration of a collective
agreement such as age sixty-five or eligibility for Medicare; T'0 (2)
past practices of continuing payment of such benefits during strikes
or periods when no collective bargaining agreement was in effect; 0 5
(3) inducements to continue employment in expectation of such ben-
efits upon retirement; 0 6 (4) language of obligation contained in
booklets summarizing insurance coverage or trust fund plans,'0 7 or
corporate or trustee resolutions and communications. 08
Evidence deemed relevant to support a holding that the employer's
obligation is limited to the duration of a current agreement has in-
cluded: (1) recognition of the need for discretion of plan trustees to
modify benefits as financial and other circumstances require;109 (2)
effectuation of prior benefit reductions without objection from the
beneficiaries;" 0 (3) negotiation history indicating a parity of benefits
evidence of a lack of vesting. See, e.g., United Auto Workers v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 561
F. Supp. 288, 296, 300 (W.D. Mich. 1983); San Diego Floor Coverers Joint Ins. Trust
(1983 unpublished arbitration) (Weckstein, Arb.).
103. E.g., Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 725 F.2d 1211, 1224 (9th Cir. 1984).
104. E.g., Keffer v. Connors Steel Co., 6 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) I 23,717M
(S.D. W. Va. 1986); Johnston Group, Inc., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8503, at
5121 (Jan. 16, 1986) (Cole, Arb.).
105. E.g., Local Union No. 150-A, United Food & Comm. Workers Int'l Union v.
Dubuque Packing Co., 756 F.2d 66, 69 (8th Cir. 1985); Bower, 725 F.2d at 1225; United
Auto Workers v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2525, 2529, 2531
(W.D. Mich. 1982), a ffd, 728 F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1984); see Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch,
Inc., 773 F.2d 669, 676 n.6 (6th Cir. 1985). But see District 17, United Mine Workers v.
Allied Corp., 735 F.2d 121, 126-27, 129-30 (4th Cir. 1984); American-Standard, Inc.,
57 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 698, 700 (1971) (Warns, Arb.) (rejecting a cut-off of benefits dur-
ing a strike as precluding a finding of vesting based on clear language); Barnes &
Mishkind, supra note 79, at 605.
106. E.g., United Auto Workers v. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d 1476, 1481-82 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984); Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wis. 2d
226, 271 N.W.2d 879 (1978); Sheehy v. Seilon, Inc., 10 Ohio St. 2d 242, 227 N.E.2d
229, 230 (1967); Roxbury Carpet Co., 73-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8521, at 4938-
39 (Oct. 26, 1973) (Summers, Arb.).
107. See Bower, 725 F.2d at 1224. But see Turner v. Local Union No. 302, In-
ternationa Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219, 1226 n.11 (9th Cir. 1979).
108. See Sheehy v. Seilon, Inc., 10 Ohio St. 2d 242, 227 N.E.2d 229 (1967). Com-
munications indicating no continuing obligation are evidence of a lack of vesting. See,
e.g., United Auto Workers v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 288, 293-94, 296, 300
(W.D. Mich. 1983).
109. See Turner, 604 F.2d at 1223, 1225-26, 1228; Weiss v. United Whelan Corp.,
158 N.Y.L.J. 17, 2 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) 1 7004 (Sup. Ct. 1967); San Diego Floor
Coverers Joint Ins. Trust (1983 unpublished arbitration) (Weckstein, Arb.); cf. UMW
Plan, 455 U.S. at 575; Palino v. Casey, 664 F.2d 854, 858 (1st Cir. 1981).
110. See United Rubber Workers v. Lee Nat'l Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1181, 1187-88
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Korneghy, 71 So. 2d 292, 296 (Ala. Ct.
App.), petition for cert. stricken, 71 So. 2d 301 (Ala. 1954); cf. United Auto Workers v.
Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2525, 2531 (W.D. Mich. 1982);
for active and retired workers (when the benefits for active employ-
ees have been reduced or terminated);11' (4) calculation or costing-
out of benefits in accordance with each contract term;112 (5) insur-
ance funding and coverage obligations limited to the current term of
the agreement.113
The holdings in the cases, for or against a continuing retiree bene-
fit funding obligation, do not appear to have varied with the nature
of the health and welfare benefit in question, whether life insurance
or medical benefits, 1 4 for example. Nor have they varied with the
reasons for the attempted reduction or termination whether due to
plant closure,11 5 sale or ceasing of a business, 16 expiration of a col-
lective bargaining agreement,11 7 bankruptcy or threat of financial
Johnston Group Inc., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8503, at 5121 (Jan. 16, 1986)(Cole, Arb.).
111. See Metal Polishers Local 11 v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 368, 374(S.D. Ohio 1982); United Rubber Workers v. Lee Nat'l Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1181, 1188(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8109, at 3463(Dec. 28, 1978) (Chapman, Arb.), vacated on other grounds, 642 F.2d 452 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1981).
112. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8109, at 3462 (Dec. 28,1979) (Chapman, Arb.); cf. District 17, United Mine Workers v. Allied Corp., 735 F.2d
121, 126-27 (4th Cir. 1984); Turner v. Local Union No. 302, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,604 F.2d 1219, 1223, 1225 (9th Cir. 1979); United Rubber Workers v. Lee Nat'l Corp.,
323 F. Supp. 1181, 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). But cf. Roxbury Carpet Co., 73-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 1 8521, at 4940-41 (Oct. 26, 1973) (Summers, Arb.).
113. See District 17, United Mine Workers, 735 F.2d at 124, 126-27; Turner, 604
F.2d at 1225-26; Metal Polishers Local 11, 538 F.2d at 374; United Auto Workers v.
Roblin Indus., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 288, 296, 300 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Metropolitan LifeIns. Co. v. Korneghy, 71 So. 2d 292, 295, 296-300 (Ala. 1954); Coulter Mfg. Ltd., 59
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1055, 1057-58 (1972) (Weatherill, Arb.).
For a review of relevant factors in determining contractual intent, see Barnes &
Mishkind, supra note 79, at 602-05.
114. Compare Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1202 (1986) (health insurance) and Roxbury Carpet Co., 73-2
Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8521 (Oct. 26, 1973) (Summers, Arb.) (life insurance) withTurner v. Local Union No. 302, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219 (9th
Cir. 1979) (health insurance) and Weiss v. United Whelan Corp., 158 N.Y.L.J. 17, 2Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) 1 7004 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (life insurance).
115. Compare United Auto Workers v. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984) and Local Union No. 150-A, United Food & Comm.Workers Int'l Union v. Dubuque Packing Co., 756 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1985) with UnitedAuto Workers v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 288 (W.D. Mich. 1983) and Metal
Polishers Local 11 v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 368 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
116. Compare District 17, United Mine Workers v. Allied Corp., 735 F.2d 121(4th Cir. 1984) (sale) and Box v. Coalite, Inc., 6 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) 1 23,7152(N.D. Ala. 1986) (ceased business) with Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 725 F.2d 1221 (9thCir. 1984) (ceased business) and Sheehy v. Seilon, Inc., 10 Ohio St. 2d 242, 247 N.E.2d
229 (1967) (sale).
117. Compare Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc. 773 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1985) (contract
expired and plant closed) and United Auto Workers v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., 728F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1984) (contract expired) with Metal Polishers Local 11 v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 368 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (contract expired and plant closed) and
Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) % 8109 (Dec. 28, 1978) (Chapman,
Arb.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1981) (same).
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problems.11 8 When a contract was construed as requiring continua-
tion of existing benefits in the absence of good cause, one court has
held that a threat to the financial base of the entire company, rather
than the inability of past contributions to pay for the present level of
benefits, was required.1 9
In some cases, rather than relying upon extrinsic evidence of the
parties' intent, courts have indulged in speculative scrutiny of fine
distinctions in contract language to support questionable inferences
as to whether a contractual vesting of retiree health and welfare ben-
efits was intended.120 This has occurred, for example, when an em-
ployer decides to go out of business or shut down a plant. Usually, in
such cases, for many years, both the company and union would have
assumed, or act like they assumed, that the business operation would
continue indefinitely. In this situation, Professor Clyde Summers
aptly observed:
The difficulty here is that the parties had no intent one way or the other on
the specific issue when they negotiated the agreement, or any of those
which preceded it. No one at any time even broached the question of what
would happen if the Company went out of business. There is no evidence
that such a possibility even crossed either party's mind .... It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the words of the Agreement provide no clear guide;
fi they seemed to, it would only be an illusion, an unintended result ....
When confronted with such a problem of interpretation, little is gained by
dissecting the words of the contract or searching for intent on a matter
which no one considered. Whatever intent is found will not be one which
118. Compare White Farm Equip. Co. v. White Farm Corp., 788 F.2d 1186 (6th
Cir. 1986) (bankruptcy sale and reorganization) and Turner v. Local Union No. 302,
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979) (fund depletion) with
Thonen v. McNeil-Akron, 6 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) 23,714B (N.D. Ohio 1986) (fi-
nancial difficulties) and Eardman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Employee Welfare Benefit
Plans, 607 F. Supp. 196 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (benefit reduction); see also Musto v. Ameri-
can Gen. Corp., 6 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) 23,693W (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
119. Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 6 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) % 23,693W (M.D.
Tenn. 1985).
An amendment to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(c)(2) (as amended 1984),
authorizes the court to approve a bankrupt employer's modification of a collective bar-
gaining agreement only if, after negotiation, the employees' authorized representative
rejects the modification without good cause. These requirements have been applied to a
proposal to stop paying for retirement benefits. Century Brass Prod., Inc. v. United Auto
Workers, 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 433 (1986).
120. See infra notes 122-32, 137-42 and accompanying text; Upholster's Int'l
Union v. American Pad & Textile Co., 372 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1967) (comparisons of
contract language can be useful, but is best supplemented by extrinsic evidence); see also
Keffer v. Connors Steel Co., 6 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) 23,717M (S.D. W.Va. 1986);
Thonen v. McNeil-Akron, 6 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) 23,714B (N.D. Ohio 1986);
United Auto Workers v. New Castle Foundry, Inc., 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3589 (S.D.
Ind. 1983); Johnston Group Inc., 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8503, at 5119-20
(Jan. 16, 1986) (Cole, Arb.).
was in the mind of the parties but one which was constructed by the
interpretation.121
Nevertheless, in recent cases, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
appears to have engaged in such creative construction. In United
Auto Workers v. Yard-Man, Inc.,122 the Sixth Circuit affirmed a
summary judgment that the parties had intended that retirees'
health and life insurance benefits survived a plant closing and the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement providing for them.
The court properly stated that a grant of lifetime benefits must find
its genesis in the parties' agreement, and that the intended meaning
of even the most explicit language can only be understood in light of
the context which gave rise to its inclusion. 128 Resolution of ambigui-
ties in durational provisions of an agreement could be guided, ac-
cording to the court, by reference to other words and phrases in the
collective agreement. 2 4 Because the parties sought a summary judg-
ment and presented no extrinsic evidence to the district court, the
question of contractual intent was treated as one of law to be deter-
mined solely by the terms of the agreement. 25
The Yard-Man court correctly rejected the employer's contention
that a contract clause that the company "will provide insurance ben-
efits equal to the active group benefits . . . for the former employee
and his spouse" plainly and unambiguously limited the duration of
retiree benefits to that of active employees. 12' The clause could refer
solely to the nature of the benefits and not to their duration, and an
interpretation which was harmonious with the entire document was
sought in other contract provisions. 27 Interestingly, the court noted(despite its earlier stated limitation) the extrinsic evidence that the
employer in fact paid retiree benefits after the active employees' ben-
efits were to have ceased, as provided in the agreement, with their
layoff. The court concluded that the layoff of active employees was
an inappropriate criterion for determining the duration of retiree
benefits, and explicitly recognized that "the parties never considered
or perhaps never resolved the issue of whether retiree benefits would
continue after plant closure."'1 28 Nevertheless, the court went on to
"find" the parties' intent in other contract provisions.
121. Roxbury Carpet Co., 73-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8521, at 4937 (Oct.
26, 1973) (Summers, Arb.).
122. 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984). For a
more sympathetic analysis of Yard-Man and other recent Sixth Circuit cases, see Greg-
ory, COBRA: Congress Provides Partial Protection Against Employer Termination ofRetiree Health Insurance, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 77 (1987), in this issue.
123. Yardman, F.2d at 1479.
124. Id. at 1479-80.
125. Id. at 1480 n.1.
126. Id. at 1480.
127. Id. at 1480-81.
128. Id. at 1481 n.3.
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One such provision stated that when a retiree dies, his dependents'
health insurance coverage would end with the expiration of the
agreement. Although the court acknowledged that that limitation
did not preclude an intent to also terminate the retiree's benefits
with the expiration of the collective agreement, it concluded - with-
out stated reason or evidence - that "it is more reasonable to infer
that the spouse-dependent child provision was meant as an exception
to the anticipated continuation of benefits beyond the life of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 1 29 Yet, it seems at least equally rea-
sonable to assume that the parties' intent was to be beneficent in the
situation of a retiree's death by not immediately terminating his de-
pendents' coverage but allowing it to continue for as long as his cov-
erage would have continued, that is, to the expiration of the collec-
tive agreement. 130
While other contractual language relied upon by the court may be
more convincing,131 the search for the parties' intent in this dissec-
tion of contract language, probably adopted without reference to any
thought of the survival of retiree health and welfare benefits upon
plant closing, is, in Professor Summers' words, "an illusion."132 The
court's conclusion as to which of equally plausible, but conflicting,
alternative inferences to draw from the words of the agreement was
probably significantly influenced by the court's policy orientation on
the question of whether, in the absence of clear evidence of the par-
ties' intent, retiree health and welfare benefits should survive beyond
the contract providing for them. While Yard-Man acknowledges
some influence of such policy considerations, 33 to be discussed
shortly,13 ' a more recent Sixth Circuit opinion, Weimer v. Kurz-
129. Id. at 1481.
130. The court also noted that a provision of the agreement concerning another
benefit program specifically provided for continuation only for the duration of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, whereas there was no such specific limitation on the duration
of retiree insurance benefits. Id. at 1481-82. In a footnote, however, the court dismisses,
as merely confirming an independent requirement, the specific contract language provid-
ing for the continuation beyond the agreement's duration of supplemental pension bene-
fits. Id. at 1482 n.7. Why was not the inference equally compelling that since the parties
expressly provided for continuation of some benefits beyond the expiration of the agree-
ment, they would have similarly provided for retiree health and welfare benefits, if that
was their intention?
131. Id. at 1481 (regarding an obligation of early retirees to pay the cost of insur-
ance until picked up by the company at age 65).
132. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
133. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482-83.
134. See infra notes 145-74 and accompanying text.
Kasch, Inc.,13 5 illustrates this conclusion even more dramatically.
Following an impasse in bargaining for a new contract, and a
strike, Kurz-Kasch, Inc., decided to close its South Broadway plant
and terminate the life and medical insurance benefits of the plant's
retired employees. Unions representing different bargaining units
brought two separate suits on behalf of retired workers. In the Metal
Polisher's suit, the district court granted summary judgment for the
employer on the basis that the company's obligation to pay retiree
health and welfare benefits terminated along with the last collective
bargaining agreement which had provided for them.13 That judg-
ment was not appealed. However, in a suit brought by the Moulders
and Machinists, the district court's grant of summary judgment for
the employer was reversed on appeal1 37 with direction to enter sum-
mary judgment for the unions because the Sixth Circuit construed
essentially the same collective bargaining agreement language as
precluding the employer from terminating retiree benefits.1 3 The
court followed its Yard-Man precedent and treated this issue as one
of contract interpretation, solely of law, without a need to consider
extrinsic evidence or to give any special deference to the trial court's
findings.1, 9
The court carefully dissected the language in the union agree-
ments, and, contrary to the district's court interpretation of the same
language, concluded that a clause in the group insurance plans for
retirees which obligated the company to pay the premiums for ex-
isting plans "as long as such Employee remains retired and unem-
ployed"1 40 granted lifetime benefits to retired workers subject only to
the condition that they remain retired and unemployed.141 The possi-
135. 773 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1985).
136. The Metal Polishers suit was referred sua sponte by the district court to arbi-
tration. The arbitrator found for the company and approved its termination of retiree
health and welfare benefits. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8109(Dec. 28, 1978) (Chapman, Arb.). The union's attempt to vacate the award was rebuffedby the district court but granted on appeal by the Sixtb Circuit. The court of appeals
held that the arbitration award was beyond the scope of arbitrable jurisdiction because
the union had never requested arbitration, as required by the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Metal Polishers, Int'l Union v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 642 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1981). On remand, the district court again found for the
company but without giving any consideration to the arbitrator's award. Metal Polishers
Local I1 v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 368 (S.D. Ohio 1982); see also Weimer, 773
F.2d at 671 n.1; Stewart & Kelly, supra note 97, at 522-23.
137. Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., F. Supp. (S.D. Ohio) (not reported), rev'd, 773
F.2d 669, 670-71 (6th Cir. 1985).
138. Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1985).
139. Id. at 671.
140. Similar language was contained in the other union's contract.
141. Weimer, 773 F.2d at 673-74. The district court in the Metal Polishers case
had found language identical to that in the Moulders contract to be "arguably ambigu-
ous" and therefore subject to the express termination clause. Metal Polishers, 538 F.
Supp. at 372.
126
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bility that this language also was intended to be limited by the term
of the collective agreement was expressly rejected, despite the dis-
trict court's conclusion that the clause, in each contract, providing
that "the Agreement and all terms and conditions hereof shall termi-
nate as of the end of the term" in which notice to terminate or
amend is given, applied to the retirees' benefits.142 The appellate
court's contrary construction was acknowledged to be influenced by
Yard-Man's announced disposition that "when parties contract for
benefits which accrue upon achievement of retiree status, there is an
inference that the parties likely intended those benefits to continue so
long as the beneficiary remains a retiree. '143
This is a reasonable inference, but it should be recognized that to
the extent such inferences influence the determination of whether re-
tiree health and welfare benefits survive beyond the agreement creat-
ing them, it is an external policy of the court that is used to aid
contract interpretation, and not a discovery of the parties' intent or
even an interpretation that necessarily will, as appropriately sug-
gested by Professor Summers, "achieve their purposes" and "further
and not frustrate their values." 14' Consequently, it is appropriate to
examine the policy underpinnings of such aids to contract
construction.
142. Weimer, 773 F.2d at 675-76. It is true that a general termination clause does
not necessarily include retiree benefits, and it is even possible to conclude that a contract
provision for retiree benefits will terminate (as applied to the future creation of a right to
benefits) without a termination of the right to continuing benefits already created by
prior contracts. See Johnston Group, Inc., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8503, at
5119 (Jan. 16, 1986) (Cole, Arb.). Nevertheless, it is equally plausible to interpret an
all-inclusive termination clause as applying to the termination of retiree benefits unless
there is an express exclusion of such benefits in the contract or extrinsic evidence indi-
cates the parties' intention to continue them. See United Auto Workers v. Roblin Indus.,
Inc., 561 F. Supp. 288, 298, 300 (W.D. Mich. 1983); United Auto Workers v. New
Castle Foundry, Inc., 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3589, 3590-91 (S.D. Ind. 1983); Metal Pol-
ishers, Local 11 v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 368 (S.D. Ohio 1982); United Rubber
Workers v. Lee Nat'l Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1181, 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Kurz-Kasch,
Inc., 79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8109 (Dec. 28, 1978) (Chapman, Arb.), vacated
on other grounds, 642 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1981);
Coulter Mfg. Ltd., 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1055 (1972) (Weatherill, Arb.). See generally
Stewart & Kelly, supra note 97; Barnes & Mishkind, supra note 79, at 586. The district
court in both Kurz-Kasch cases adopted such an interpretation of the identical language
in all three union agreements and concluded that the retiree benefits were limited to the
term of the agreement. See Metal Polishers, 538 F. Supp. at 372-73.
143. Weimer, 773 F.2d at 673 (quoting Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482).
144. Roxbury Carpet Co., 73-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8521, at 4937 (Oct.
26, 1973) (Summers, Arb.).
The Use of Policy Presumptions
In cases where the governing contract is silent or ambiguous re-
garding the duration of retiree health and welfare benefits, and cred-
ible evidence of implied obligations is sparse or conflicting, resolution
can be aided by public policy presumptions or inferences. Presump-
tions could be adopted, for or against a lifetime commitment to pay
the benefits, which would prevail unless rebutted by persuasive evi-
dence to the contrary. These presumptions can be intelligently devel-
oped from the relevant legal, economic and social policies. Courts
and arbitrators have adppted and applied such presumptions, but un-
fortunately in conflicting directions.1 45
Those cases which have presumed, in the absence of contrary over-
riding evidence, that the right to health and welfare benefits for re-
tirees terminates with the contract which created that right, have
relied upon the following policies and factors: (1) the distinction be-
tween pension benefits, which do vest upon satisfaction of prerequi-
sites and are actuarially funded, and health and welfare benefits
which can only vest upon an express or implied contractual under-
taking; 46 (2) the renegotiability of collective bargaining agreement
provisions;247 (3) the interdependence of current and retired employ-
ees as members of the same insurance group, and the likelihood that
premiums would be higher for a group composed only of retirees; 148
(4) the unfair financial burden on current employees to have em-
ployer compensation diverted to the increased cost of retiree bene-fits,1 48 if the business continues, and the unanticipated, and perhaps
145. Compare White Farm Equip. Co. v. White Farm Corp., 788 F.2d 1186,
1191-93 (6th Cir. 1986) and Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8109(Dec. 28, 1978) (Chapman, Arb.) with United Auto Workers v. Cadillac Malleable Iron
Co., Inc., 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2525, 2530 (W.D. Mich. 1982), afid on other grounds,
728 F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1984) and Roxbury Carpet Co., 73-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1
8521, at 4940 (Oct. 26, 1973) (Summers, Arb.); see also cases cited infra notes 146-54;
Stewart & Kelly, supra note 97, at 525-27.
146. See, e.g., District 17, United Mine Workers y. Allied Corp., 735 F.2d 121,
129 (4th Cir. 1984); Turner v. Local Union No. 302, International Bhd. of Teamsters,
604 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1979); Box v. Coalite, 6 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH)
23,715Z (N.D. Ala. 1986); Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) % 8109, at
3463 (Dec. 28, 1978) (Chapman, Arb.), vacated on other grounds, 642 F.2d 452 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1981); see also White Farm Equip. Co. v. White
Farm Corp., 788 F.2d 1186, 1191-93 (6th Cir. 1986). See authorities cited supra notes
38 to 50 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., District 17, United Mine Workers, 735 F.2d at 126-27, 129; United
Auto Workers v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 288, 300 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
148. See, e.g., United Auto Workers, 561 F. Supp. 296, 299; Metal Polishers Local
1i v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 368, 374 (S.D. Ohio 1982); United Rubber Work-
ers v. Lee Nat'l Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1181, 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 79-
1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) % 8109, at 3463 (Dec. 28, 1978) (Chapman, Arb.). But see
Roxbury Carpet Co., 73-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8521, at 4940-41 (Oct. 26, 1973)
(Summers, Arb.).
149. See, e.g., Turner v. Local Union No. 302, Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219, 1228
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unfair, burden on an employer to continue to pay costs of unfunded
retiree health and welfare benefits after the income from the facility
at which they were formerly employed has ceased due to plant clo-
sure or sale of the business.1
50
Presumptions in favor of a continuing obligation to pay for retiree
health and welfare benefits have often rested upon the concept of all
retirement benefits as deferred compensation for which a person has
qualified by working the requisite number of years and reaching the
required age.151 Retirement benefits have been referred to as "sta-
tus" benefits which continue as long as the retirement status contin-
ues, that is, until the person returns to employment or dies.152 Other
factors contributing to these conclusions have been the relative lack
of bargaining power of retirees whose interests their unions are not
obligated to protect 53 and the relative hardship of forcing persons on
fixed income to pick up the unanticipated and often high cost of con-
tinuing benefits or to go without adequate protection of their families
and themselves. 1"
Policies of this nature have been influencial in the Sixth Circuit
decisions in favor of retirees.
(9th Cir. 1979). See supra notes 47-51. For example in Turner there were more employ-
ees whose benefits had to be paid for by employer contributions based upon a decreased
number of hours worked by a lesser number of active employees. See also San Diego
Floor Coverers Joint Ins. Trust (1983 unpublished arbitration) (Weckstein, Arb.).
150. See District 17, United Mine Workers, 735 F.2d at 128, 130-34 (holding the
multi-employer trust responsible for retirees "orphaned" by their former employer's sale
of its business). But see id. at 134-36 (Sprouse, J., dissenting); Roxbury Carpet Co., 73-2
Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8521, at 4940-41 (Oct. 26, 1973) (Summers, Arb.).
151. See generally Stewart & Kelly, supra note 97; Barnes & Mishkind, supra
note 79; see, e.g., Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482; United Auto Workers v. Cadillac Malle-
able Iron Co., Inc., 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2525 (W.D. Mich. 1982), aff'd, 728 F.2d 807
(6th Cir. 1984); Johnston Group, Inc., 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8503, at 5119-
20 (Jan. 16, 1986) (Cole, Arb.); Roxbury Carpet Co., 73-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
8521, at 4938-39 (Oct. 26, 1973) (Summers, Arb.); see also infra notes 155-56 and
accompanying text. But see United Auto Workers v. Roblin Indus. Inc., 561 F. Supp.
288, 294-300 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Barnes & Mishkind, supra note 79, at 588-89, 593.
152. See, e.g., Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1202 (1986); Local Union No. 150-A, United Food and Comm.
Workers Int'l Union v. Dubuque Packing Co., 756 F.2d 66, 70 (8th Cir. 1985); Yard-
Man, 716 F.2d at 1482; Thonen v. McNeil-Akron, 6 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) 23,714B
(N.D. Ohio 1986). See also infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609, 613 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1202 (1986); Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482, 1485-86.
154. See, e.g., Keffer v. Connors Steel Co., 6 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) t 23,717M
(S.D. W. Va. 1986); Stewart & Kelly, supra note 97, at 533.
Deferred Compensation
In Yard-Man, the court, noting that benefits for retirees are only
permissive not mandatory subjects of bargaining, stated that "it is
unlikely that such benefits, which are typically understood as a form
of delayed compensation or reward for past services, would be left to
the contingencies of future negotiations."' 15 If current employees
"forego wages now in expectation of retiree benefits, they would
want assurance that once they retire they will continue to receive
such benefits regardless of the bargain reached in subsequent
agreements.""""
The difficulty with this analysis is that it proves too much, some of
which does not logically follow. In part, retiree health and welfare
benefits may be the result of a conscious decision of current employ-
ees to forego present income in expectation of such benefits upon
retirement. But this intentional act of financial planning cannot be
the basis of an increase in health and welfare benefits for workers
who are already retired, and had a more limited trust plan estab-
lished for them while they were active employees. Such increases
may be an act of moral charity or social responsibility, 157 or may be
based upon the plan trustees' prudent disposition of fund surpluses
accumulated in periods of high return on their investments.158 More-
over, the current employees may not have acted on the assumption
that, once granted, retiree health and welfare benefits may not be
reconsidered at future bargaining sessions when conditions have
changed.159
In a footnote to the Yard-Man analysis, the court states: "Clearly,
the union may choose to forego such benefits in future negotiations
in favor of more immediate compensation. It may not, however, bar-
gain away retiree benefits which have already vested in particular
individuals. Such rights, once vested upon the employee's retirement,
are interminable . .. ."16
155. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Johnston Group Inc., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8503, at
5120-21 (Jan. 16, 1986) (Cole, Arb.).
158. See San Diego Floor Coverers Joint Ins. Trust (1983 unpublished arbitration)
(Weckstein, Arb.).
159. For example, if, as occurred in the construction industry, fewer active em-
ployees are working fewer hours, would it likely be their rational decision to continue to
support a high level of health and welfare benefits for a large number of retired workers,
and to forego immediate take home pay, in the expectation that when they retire there
will be enough unionized construction work to support them in a similar fashion? See id.;
Palino v. Casey, 664 F.2d 854, 856-57 (1st Cir. 1981); see also Turner v. Local Union
No. 302, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1979) (dairy
industry).
160. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482 n.8. Interestingly, the employees who have re-
cently forgone current income in favor of anticipated retirement benefits are not likely to
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Remarkably, this footnote is subsequently cited in Kurz-Kasch to
support the conclusion that "this court recognized that normally re-
tiree benefits are vested." 161 The Sixth Circuit panel in Yard-Man
did not make any such statement. Nor is the statement justified by
reference to Pittsburgh Plate Glass which stated in dictum that:
"Under established contract principles, vested retirement rights may
not be altered without the pensioners' consent. ' 162 In other words, if
a contract provides for the vesting of retiree benefits, they cannot be
altered without consent. The Court did not say that contractually
provided retiree benefits are always, or normally, or more often than
not, vested. To conclude otherwise, as the Sixth Circuit has appar-
ently done, also ignores the statutory distinction made in ERISA,
and widely recognized, between pension retirement benefits, which
do normally vest, and welfare retirement benefits which do not vest
absent a contractual undertaking of that nature.""
"Status" Benefits
Yard-Man also concludes that retiree benefits are status benefits
which "as such, carry with them an inference that they continue so
long as the prerequisite status is maintained," 1 4 that is, retirement.
The court was careful to add, however, that it knows of no federal
labor policy which "presumptively favor[s] the finding of intermina-
ble rights to retiree insurance benefits when the collective bargaining
agreement is silent."1815 Rather, the status factor "simply provides
another inference of intent" to buttress other evidence of such intent
in the language of the agreement. 88
be the beneficiaries of this vesting protection since they probably have not yet retired,
and, under the court's analysis, they may lose such benefits upon future renegotiations by
the union, prior to their retirement.
161. Weimer, 773 F.2d at 672.
162. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 181 n.20. See supra text accompanying
note 78.
163. See supra notes 38-46, 146 and accompanying text.
164. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
165. Id.
166. Id. The Sixth Circuit reinforced this distinction between an inference and a
presumption in a subsequent case affirming a holding that retiree health and welfare
benefits survived after the expiration and nonrenewal of the collective bargaining agree-
ment which had provided for them. United Auto Workers v. Cadillac Malleable Iron
Co., 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2525 (W.D. Mich. 1982), a~fd, 728 F.2d 807 (6th Cir.
1984). The court expressly rejected, however, the district court's adoption of a "presump-
tion" in favor of the vesting of retirement benefits. Id. at 808. Nevertheless, the circuit
court states that the district court's analysis was quite similar to that described in Yard-
Man, id. at 809, and the lower court's opinion earlier had been cited with approval by
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482; Bower v. Bunker Hill Co.,
Yard-Man seemed to draw a distinction between an inference,
which arises from the context of the facts of a particular case, and a
presumption, which arises from usual policies or practices but not
necessarily those followed by the parties in the particular case. 167
The distinction, however, may not be significant. Unless they are
considered irrebuttable, and therefore rules of law, the primary func-
tion of a presumption is to assign the burden of producing evidence,
and provide a basis for a decision in favor of the party benefitting
from the presumption in the absence of rebutting evidence. Even if
rebutted, an inference (especially when the presumption is based on
custom) may remain to be weighed along with other evidence. 6 8
In the context of retiree health and welfare benefits, a presump-
tion in either direction, uniformly adhered to, would be defensible
and helpful in assigning the burden of proof. In this author's opinion,
however, a presumption in favor of no continuing employer or trust
fund liability for benefits beyond the expiration of a contract would
be more soundly based upon probable intent and relevant policies. In
almost all legal contests over the issue, the retirees or their repre-
sentatives, initiate the suit or arbitration. As such, normal rules
would place the burdens of initial production of evidence and of per-
suasion on them as the moving parties.""9 There does not appear to
be any overriding consideration for shifting the assignment of these
burdens. 17 0 Moreover, it is ordinarily presumed that the rights and
obligations in a collective bargaining contract do not survive the ex-
piration of the agreement in the absence of proof of a contrary intent
725 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1984). The district court's decision in Cadillac Malleable,
has been criticized as reaching conclusions not supported by the authorities it cites, and
confusing the nature of vacation benefit entitlement, which may vest as earned by the
requisite period of employment, and that of health and welfare benefits such as medical
and life insurance. See Stewart & Kelly, supra note 97, at 526-27, 528 n.34; San Diego
Floor Coverers Joint Ins. Trust (1983 unpublished arbitration) (Weckstein, Arb.). Com-pare Schneider v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 456 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1972); Suastez v. PlasticDress-Up Co., 31 Cal. 3d 774, 647 P.2d 122, 183 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1982).
167. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482; Cadillac Malleable, 728 F.2d at 808-09.
Nevertheless, the Kurz-Kasch case cites the "status" inference and the "delayed" com-
pensation" characterization in Yard-Man as "two factors weighing in favor of an inter-pretation that retiree benefits survive expiration of the collective bargaining agreement."Weimer, 773 F.2d at 672. These factors also have been emphasized by other courts indetermining the issue along with other interpretative guides to an unclear contractual
intent. See authorities cited supra notes 151 & 152.
168. See generally K. BROUN, G. Dix, E. GELLHORN, D. KAYE, R. MEISENHOLDER,
E. ROBERTS & J. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 965-84 (3d ed. 1984); see also 0.
FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 280-90 (2d ed.
1983); M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 24-27 (1980).
169. Barnes & Mishkind, supra note 79, at 600; Stewart & Kelly, supra note 97,
at 525-26; see, e.g., United Auto Workers v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 288, 297
(W.D. Mich. 1983).
170. As is done, for example, in arbitrations challenging employee discipline when
the pertinent facts are more likely to be most available to the employer. See M. HILL &
A. SINICROPI, supra note 168, at 13-14.
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as to specific provisions. 17 1 Requiring retirees, or their representa-
tives, to prove a continuation of their health and welfare benefits is a
fair and logical application of this common understanding of partici-
pants in collective bargaining. This conclusion also is consistent with
current law which distinguishes between the mandatory vesting of
pension benefits, for which accrued funding is required, and nonvest-
ing of health and welfare benefits in the absence of contract. 172 Per-
haps that law should be changed, but until it is, a party asserting
contractual vesting can be reasonably asked to prove it.
Economic Hardship
The comparative economic hardships on fixed income retirees, on
the one hand, or on financially strapped employers, and perhaps their
current employees, on the other, seem almost, equally balanced. Both
retirees and employers may justly claim detrimental reliance on their
legitimate expectations.17 Indeed, if employer expectations were
otherwise, they might be unwilling to bargain about this permissive
subject,1 4 and that would hardly benefit their retirees. Obviously, an
employer who agrees to fund health and welfare benefits for employ-
ees during their retirement must do so in good faith. But if unex-
pected downturns in business make a continuing fulfillment of that
expectation financially infeasible, the employer should be entitled to
renegotiate or readjust future payments, unless the employer has
knowingly committed itself to an obligation that survives existing
collective bargaining or employment contracts.
A better solution, of course, would be to provide some form of
accrued funding or cost sharing which would protect the expecta-
tions of all parties. Legislation may be required to accomplish these
ends, and as indicated in the next section, it is both desirable and
feasible.
171. See, e.g., District 17, United Mine Workers v. Allied Corp., 735 F.2d 121,
127 (4th Cir. 1984); United Auto Workers v. Roblin, Ind., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 288, 298,
300 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Coulter Mfg. Ltd., 59 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1055, 1057
(1972) (Weatherill, Arb.); Stewart & Kelly, supra note 97, at 530-33; Barnes &
Mishkind, supra note 79, at 601.
172. See supra notes 38-50, 146 and accompanying text.
173. See Metal Polishers Local 11 v. Kurz-Kasch, 538 F. Supp. 368, 374 (S.D.
Ohio 1982); Barnes & Mishkind, supra note 79, at 610-11; Stewart & Kelly, supra note
97, at 533; see also cases cited supra notes 148-50 & 54.
Compare the arguments in favor of presuming the vesting of severance benefits in
Shawe & Swerdlin, You Promised! - May an Employer Cancel or Modify Employee
Severance Pay Arrangements?, 44 MD. L. REv. 903, 924-25 (1985).
174. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
LEGISLATIVE BAND-AIDS AND SUPPORTING CASTS
There are a large number of retired employees who depend upon
their former employers' financial assistance in meeting increasing
medical and other health and welfare costs.1 5 These include employ-
ees who are on disability retirement, those who are induced to retire
early as a cost saving measure by the company's promises, among
other things, to pay medical insurance premiums, or who discover,
upon age sixty-five retirement, that Medicare fails to adequately ad-
dress their medical needs.17 6 If their former employer subsequently
encounters financial problems, goes into bankruptcy, or ceases busi-
ness entirely, the retirees' health and welfare benefits frequently be-
come vulnerable.
Congress has become increasingly aware, and concerned, about
the plight of these retired workers as well as those current employees
and their dependents who lose health insurance benefits through lay-
off or other reasons beyond their control. One such situation which
has prompted legislative action is the chapter 11 Bankruptcy pro-
ceedings of LTV Corporation (the former Republic Steel and Jones
& Laughlin Steel companies). LTV has 78,000 retirees, whose bene-
fits the company sought to terminate when it filed for bankruptcy.
After the Senate passed a bill requiring LTV to continue paying for
the retired steelworkers' health benefits, the company did so, pursu-
ant to a bankruptcy court order issued over the objection of other
creditors who were unhappy with the payment preference given to
the retirees.177 Subsequently, Congress did enact a stop-gap measure
which requires that companies who enter chapter 11 proceedings,
and do not yet have a court confirmed reorganization plan, continue
to pay for medical benefits of retired former employees until May
15, 1987.178 In addition, Congress extended the health insurance
continuation provisions of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act (COBRA) to retirees of companies in chapter 11
proceedings.11 9
COBRA180 generally requires that an employer which maintains a
175. See supra notes 1, 6, 37 and accompanying text. A recent survey of public
employers indicated that 73% of the respondents provided medical benefits to retirees,
usually on a cost sharing basis. 4 Employee Relations Weeldy (BNA) 1307, 1308 (Oct.
20, 1986); see also Barnes & Mishkind, supra note 79, at 584-85; Gregory, supra note
122, at 81-82 n.16-18.
176. See supra note 1; 4 Employee Relations Weekly (BNA) 1489-90 (Dec. 1,
1986); id. 1448 (Nov. 24, 1986); id. 1145 (Sept. 15, 1986).
177. Id. at 1271 (Oct. 13, 1986).
178. Continuing Appropriations Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat.(1986). This might be characterized as general legislation with a very specific applica-
tion, or "special interest" legislation.
179. Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 222 (1986), amending Pub. L. No. 99-272, Tit.
X, § 10001, 100 Stat. 222 (1986).
180. Id. For a more detailed explanation, see Gregory, supra note 122.
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group health insurance plan offer continuing coverage, for eighteen
months, to former employees (other than those terminated for gross
misconduct) and their dependent spouse or children, for thirty-six
months, upon termination of the employed spouse, or if dependent
coverage would otherwise be lost due to divorce, death of the em-
ployee spouse, or his or her eligibility for Medicare. Continuation
coverage is at the expense of the former employee or dependent at
rates up to 102% of the group premium, and may be cut short due to
reemployment under another health plan, eligibility for Medicare,
nonpayment of premiums, or termination of the employer's group
health coverage for all of its employees. In addition, upon completion
of the continuation coverage period, the employee or dependent must
be offered an opportunity to enroll in an individual conversion health
plan provided under the employer's group plan.
Legislation such as COBRA does enable retired workers to con-
tinue their health insurance coverage at group rates and without a
showing of insurability (which could be important to elderly per-
sons), but at their own expense. It is a step in the right direction but
still a long way from a solution.
The 100th Congress which convenes in 1987 will be considering
more broadly-based reforms.181 Under the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984, the Secretary of the Treasury was directed to study possible
means of providing minimum standards for employee participation,
vesting, accrual, and funding of welfare benefit programs for current
and retired employees.1 82 The study was to have been completed by
February 1, 1985, but the completion date has been extended by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 to October 22, 1987 (one year after the
Bill's enactment)., 83 Recommendations coming out of that study
could lead to amendments of ERISA providing for insured funding
and vesting of employer health and welfare plans similar to the pro-
tection now given to pension plans. In that manner, advance and se-
cure funding, at a time when the employer could afford the pay-
ments (and benefit from the income tax deduction), would protect
the legitimate expectations of employees upon and through their
181. See 5 Employee Relations Weekly (BNA) 3 (Jan. 5, 1987); id. at 37 (Jan.
12, 1987); 4 id. at 1489-90 (Dec. 1, 1986); id. at 1448 (Nov. 24, 1986); id. at 1145
(Sept. 15, 1986); Barnes & Mishkind, supra note 79, at 610-11. The states also may get
into the act until and unless preempted by federal legislation. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. ANN.
LAWS. ch. 151A, § 71G, ch. 175 § 110D, ch. 176G, § 4A (Supp. 1986) (extending group
policies and H.M.O. coverage for limited periods following plant closings or layoffs).
182. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 560(b), 98 Stat. 494, 901 (1984).
183. Pub. L. No. 99-514 § 1167, 100 Stat. 4810 (1986).
retirement.
Other approaches could include expanding eligibility and coverage
for Medicare benefits, a program of national health insurance, or
more limited protection aimed at workers who are laid off due to
plant closures, and perhaps retirees of such companies who had been
receiving health and welfare benefits. While the political attitude
during the past few years has favored less government regulation
and spending, the new Congress convenes with Democrats in control
of both houses, and Senator Edward Kennedy, who has supported
such government assistance in the past, as Chairman of the key La-
bor Committee.18 4
Choosing between imposing financial hardships on retired employ-
ees or their former employers (and perhaps current employees) when
the cost of retiree health and welfare plans becomes oppressive is
neither easy nor pleasant. So far courts and arbitrators have been
the key decisionmakers in this win-lose game. Now the playing field
shifts to Congress and the hope that it can devise a win-win solution,
or at least a remedy that is more equitable by providing for cost
sharing and planning without placing the financial burden solely on
one of the parties when it can least afford it.
184. See 5 Employee Relations Weekly (BNA) 35, 37 (Jan. 12, 1987); 4 id. at
1510-11 (Dec. 8, 1986). S. 2402, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986), introduced by Senator
Kennedy, provided for four month's continuing health insurance for laid-off workers.
President Reagan also has recognized a need for at least some additional legislative pro-
tection of retiree health care in his recently introduced Medicare Catastrophic Illness
Coverage Act. See 5 Employee Relations Weekly (BNA) 264-65 (Mar. 2, 1987).
